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Abstract Recent replication crises in psychology and other fields have led to intense
reflection about the validity of common research practices. Much of this reflection has
focussed on reporting standards, and how they may be related to the questionable
research practices that could underlie a high proportion of irreproducible findings in the
published record. As a developing field, it is particularly important for Experimental
Philosophy to avoid some of the pitfalls that have beset other disciplines. To this end,
here we provide a detailed, comprehensive assessment of current reporting practices in
Experimental Philosophy. We focus on the quality of statistical reporting and the
disclosure of information about study methodology. We assess all the articles using
quantitative methods (n = 134) that were published over the years 2013–2016 in 29
leading philosophy journals. We find that null hypothesis significance testing is the
prevalent statistical practice in Experimental Philosophy, although relying solely on this
approach has been criticised in the psychological literature. To augment this approach,
various additional measures have become commonplace in other fields, but we find that
Experimental Philosophy has adopted these only partially: 53% of the papers report an
effect size, 28% confidence intervals, 1% examined prospective statistical power and
5% report observed statistical power. Importantly, we find no direct relation between an
article’s reporting quality and its impact (numbers of citations). We conclude with
recommendations for authors, reviewers and editors in Experimental Philosophy, to
facilitate making research statistically-transparent and reproducible.
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1 Introduction
Philosophers have recently started to adopt empirical methods to address research
questions of philosophical relevance. This practice is often referred to as Experimental
Philosophy (Knobe and Nichols 2008; Alexander 2012; Knobe et al. 2012; Machery
and O’Neill 2014; Sytsma and Buckwalter 2016), although it incorporates both exper-
imental and correlational studies. More generally, it seems that what best characterizes
this recent trend is an attempt to employ quantitative methods to make progress in
philosophy (Knobe 2015).
The application of quantitative methods raises a number of important issues for this
field. Previous research has discussed a constellation of ethical issues that have arisen
since philosophers started to conduct empirical research (Polonioli 2017). Yet experi-
mental philosophers should also be concerned with ongoing discussions, in several
empirical fields, about whether common scientific practices in design, analysis, and
reporting ought to be revised (Begley and Ellis 2012; Ioannidis 2005; Miguel et al.
2014; Simmons et al. 2011).
Such discussions are particularly heated in psychology, where a substantial number
of findings have recently failed to replicate (Makel et al. 2012; Maxwell et al. 2015;
Open Science Collaboration 2012, 2015; Pashler and Harris 2012; Simons 2014). The
‘crisis of confidence’ within psychology (Pashler and Wagenmakers 2012) arose from
finding that many published results could not be replicated when competent indepen-
dent researchers executed high-powered replication attempts that duplicated the orig-
inal methodology as closely as possible. For example, the Reproducibility Project was
set up as an open large-scale attempt at estimating the replicability of psychological
science (Open Science Collaboration 2012); it attempted to replicate 100 studies
selected from 2008 issues of three leading psychology journals (Psychological Science,
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, and Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy: Learning, Memory, and Cognition). The results of this effort, published a few
years later (Open Science Collaboration 2015) revealed that only 36% of the replica-
tions had statistically significant results, as opposed to 97% of the original studies; and
effects in replications had, on average, half the magnitude of those originally reported.
The problem does not seem to be limited to psychology: replication projects in
medicine (Prinz et al. 2011) and behavioral economics (Camerer et al. 2016) have also
delivered relatively low success rates. Replication crises are arguably multifaceted and
many different factors are likely to contribute to low reproducibility rates. Individual
misconduct or even outright fraud are known to occur, but are likely to be the exception
rather than the rule and cannot account for the problem (Fanelli 2009). Other possible
sources of irreproducibility include factors that arise at various stages of the research
process: design (e.g., selection biases), analysis (e.g., questionable research practices
such as p-hacking) and publication (e.g., a preference for the publication of statistically
significant findings) (Nosek et al. 2015; Ioannidis 2005, 2014; Ioannidis et al. 2014;
Fanelli 2010; Simmons et al. 2011; John et al. 2012). In Psychology, at least, increased
awareness of these sources of poor reproducibility has led to recent changes, including
the large-scale adoption of several new practices in analysing and reporting research,
which give reason for optimism (Nelson et al. 2018). These desirable practices—
described in further detail below—are highly relevant to Experimental Philosophy
research, which has mostly attempted to apply psychological methods in tackling
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philosophical questions. Notably, as a field, Experimental Philosophy seems aware that
reproducibility can and should be monitored, with both organized replication projects
(Cova et al. 2018) and online resources tracking replicability (http://experimental-
philosophy.yale.edu/xphipage/Experimental%20Philosophy-Replications.html).
Critiques of research practices and the editorial handling of research outputs are not
a recent phenomenon. For instance, within psychology Gigerenzer (2004) argued that
statistical inference is an incoherent hybrid of the ideas of Fisher and of Neyman and
Pearson. Others have drawn attention to the impact of publication biases on the
literature, namely the publication or non-publication of research findings depending
on the nature and direction of the results. Whilst publication biases seem to be common
in many fields (Ioannidis 2005; Ioannidis et al. 2011), psychology is one of the fields
where their impact has generated most discussion recently (Ferguson and Brannick
2012; Francis 2012, 2015; Francis et al. 2014; Ioannidis 2012). But again, this is not
new: Rosenthal (1979) pointed out almost four decades ago that the preference for
publishing positive (statistically significant) results is conducive to a file-drawer effect,
resulting in an over-representation of false positives in the published record. The recent
replication crisis has led an increasing number of scholars to issue warnings about the
shortcomings of common practices. Consequently, it has become easier—though still
by no means easy—to publish non-significant results (at least in psychology) and
initiatives such as Open Science Framework1 have promoted greater transparency of
research by encouraging openness of data and allowing pre-registration of studies.
Importantly, consensus has also emerged that current reporting practices are prob-
lematic because insufficient details are often provided, preventing accurate interpreta-
tion and evaluation of findings (Miguel et al. 2014; Simmons et al. 2011).
Some researchers have also stressed that statistical standards need to be revised. For
instance, Benjamin et al. (2018) suggested a stricter threshold for defining statistical
significance, whilst others stress instead that p values should not be treated as reliable
measures given that they might vary (sometimes dramatically) across replications, even
when the effects are real (Halsey et al. 2015; see also Cumming 2008). Moreover, some
have argued that null-hypothesis significance testing (NHST) and Bayesian inference
may lead researchers to draw different conclusions in certain cases, and that the use of
Bayesian statistics should be preferred when possible (Dienes and McLatchie 2018;
Wagenmakers et al. 2018).
The concerns regarding statistical analysis and reporting, reviewed above, have led
to various suggestions regarding the kinds of analyses that should be done and reported
in order to improve the reproducibility of findings. These suggestions include a greater
focus on full reporting of descriptive statistics, the use of confidence intervals and effect
sizes, and the employment of power calculations. A growing body of literature provides
details on the justification for these suggestions and how they should be implemented
practically (Tellez et al. 2015; Fritz et al. 2012; Tressoldi and Giofré 2015), discussing
for instance which type of effect size to use in different circumstances (Sullivan and
Feinn 2012; Lakens 2013).
These views and principles have become mainstream in psychological research. The
6th edition of the American Psychological Association Publication Manual greatly
emphasizes the importance of reporting elements such as effect sizes, confidence
1 https://osf.io
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intervals, and extensive description of procedures, which help convey the most com-
plete meaning of the results (2010, p. 33). In addition, from January 2014 Psycholog-
ical Science, the flagship journal of the Association for Psychological Science, recom-
mends the use of the Bnew statistics^—meta-analyses, effect sizes and confidence
intervals—to avoid problems associated with null-hypothesis significance testing2
(notably, confidence intervals are directly related to p-values—see, for example,
Altman and Bland 2011—so the recommendation to replace one with the other is
controversial; however, it is a testament to the current goal, within experimental
psychology, of searching for more robust ways to find and report results). Psycholog-
ical Science also encourages complete reporting of study design and methods. To allow
authors to provide clear, complete, self-contained descriptions of their studies, the
Methods and Results sections no longer count towards the total word limit. Overall,
there is recent consensus in the literature around the following two recommendations:
a) Estimation based on effect sizes, confidence intervals, and meta-analysis usually
provides a more informative analysis of empirical results than does null-hypothesis
significance testing alone.
b) Transparency in the methodologies and procedures used to obtain research find-
ings is required to allow for replication of such findings.
In other words, a reader should be able to assess the merit of a study’s findings
through a full, statistically-transparent set of reported results, and identify the condi-
tions necessary to conduct a replication (either exact or conceptual) of the original
research design. Notably, the APA manual from 2010 and the Psychological Science
submission guidelines from 2014 emphasize these aspects of reporting, but the need to
fulfil these requirements has been recognized for decades; the problem was not that
researchers were unaware of that it is better to report full methods and statistical
measures like effect sizes (e.g., Cohen 1994), but that in practice, they have not tended
to do so. We know this because several studies have assessed reporting standards over
the years, generally finding a need for improvement: Matthews et al. (2008) analyzed
101 articles published between 1996 and 2005 in 5 education journals, and found that
the proportion of articles that reported effect sizes in their results increased from an
average of 26% across journals in 1996–2000 to 46% in 2001–2005. As Matthews
et al. (2008) noted, this shows a gradual improvement but the numbers were still low
(and did not exceed 60% in any single journal), despite the fact that the APA manual
already called for reporting effect sizes during the surveyed period. In line with this,
Sun et al. (2010) surveyed articles published between 2005 and 2007 in six American
Psychological Association (APA) journals, and Fritz et al. (2012) examined articles
published a few years later (2009–2010) in a leading psychology journal (Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General); both investigations found that only around 40% of
surveyed articles reported effect sizes. A significant change—at least in psychology—
seems to have come about, however, in the 2010s, possibly following the field’s
replication crisis (Nelson et al. 2018). For example, Tressoldi et al. (2013) examined
papers published in 2011 in four high-impact and three field-specific psychology
journals, and found that in most journals (the notable exceptions were Nature and
2 https://www.psychologicalscience.org/publications/psychological_science/ps-submissions#STAT
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Science) effect sizes and/or confidence intervals were reported in a majority of arti-
cles—in the Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, for example, these mea-
sures were included in 90% of papers. Corroborating this trend, Counsell and Harlow
(2017) recently reported that over 90% of papers published in four Canadian Psychol-
ogy journals in 2013 reported measures of effect size, suggesting that the constant calls
for reporting effect sizes appear to have had an effect.
However, reporting practices may differ across research fields, as well as across the
hierarchy of publication venues. In particular, as noted in the previous paragraph, there has
been criticism of the sparse reporting standards imposed by some high-visibility, high-
impact journals: Tressoldi et al. (2013) documented widespread use of null hypothesis
significance testing without any use of confidence intervals, effect size, prospective power
and model estimation in high-impact journals such as Science and Nature.
In addition, a number of studies—including recent ones—have documented that
researchers often fail to provide sufficient methods information for conducting repli-
cations (e.g., Sifers et al. 2002; Raad et al. 2007; Bouwmeester et al. 2012; Pierce et al.
2014). For instance, Sifers et al. (2002) explored reporting of demographic and
methodological information in four major paediatric and child psychology journals.
They found that information about sample size and age was almost always reported, yet
providing details about ethnicity, socioeconomic status (SES) and the exclusion/
inclusion of participants was far from being the norm. More recently, Pierce et al.
(2014) also found that the reporting of ethnicity information in three major autism
research journals was largely unsatisfactory.
All the above is of particular relevance to Experimental Philosophy, a new field in
the process of establishing its methodologies and reporting conventions. Furthermore,
Experimental Philosophy is interested in people’s attitudes and behaviors, and largely
employs methods and analysis strategies commonly used in Experimental Psychology,
making it a sub-field, or at least sister-field, of that older discipline. It would thus be
advisable for Experimental Philosophers to take heed of both established experimental
design principles (Carmel 2011) and the recent turmoil regarding analysis and reporting
practices that science in general, and Psychology in particular, have been undergoing.
The need to be vigilant in trying to avoid other fields’ past mistakes is particularly
important because Experimental Philosophy research is conducted mostly by philoso-
phers, who are often not trained in experimental work and only rarely receive any
training in statistics. To their credit, most Experimental Philosophers (to the best of our
knowledge) do make an effort to acquire some statistical expertise, and many collab-
orate with trained psychologists. We also acknowledge that experimental philosophers
are a heterogeneous group, and that some have gained considerable quantitative
competence by informal means. But does the publication record in Experimental
Philosophy demonstrate that these efforts are sufficient?
The present investigation aims to contribute to the literature on reporting practices in
scientific research and to the healthy development of Experimental Philosophy, by
empirically exploring the reporting of methods, analyses, and results in Experimental
Philosophy publications. Assessing the overall quality of research in a field is compli-
cated and may be impossible; there is no consensus, for example, on how to quantify
the quality of research designs, so opinions may (and frequently do) differ on this
aspect of any given study. But—as the literature cited above indicates—many of the
proposed solutions for poor replicability in empirical research emphasize the consistent
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adoption of appropriate reporting practices. Use of these practices—specifically, the
reporting of sufficient method information that would allow others to replicate the
study, and the use of statistical measures such as effect sizes and confidence intervals to
complement p-values—can be quantified; furthermore, at least in Psychology, improve-
ments in reporting standards (e.g., Counsell and Harlow 2017) have occurred alongside
an overall shift in a host of practices that has led to optimism about resolving the field’s
replication crisis (Nelson et al. 2018). Although it is too soon to tell whether psycho-
logical findings have become more reproducible in recent years, and whether any such
improvements can be causally linked to changes in reporting practices, it is not too soon
to examine whether Experimental Philosophy has taken heed of these developments
and adopted appropriate reporting standards. Therefore, in the present study we focus
on experimental philosophers’ reporting of effect sizes, confidence intervals and
statistical power, as well as the transparency of information about research procedures
(see full details in the Method and Supplementary Information (https://osf.io/yp2kg)).
In doing so, we hope to help the Experimental Philosophy community establish
appropriate reporting standards and ensure that, over time, the body of work
produced in this field is largely reproducible.
2 Methods
We examined design, analysis, and reporting of research in Experimental Philosophy.
We defined Experimental Philosophy broadly (Rose and Danks 2013; Machery and
O’Neill 2014) and identified relevant Experimental Philosophy papers by following a
modified version of Polonioli’s (2017) methodology.
2.1 Inclusion Criteria
First, we selected a broad sample of peer-reviewed philosophy journals. A natural way
to identify the most important journals is by appealing to the journal impact factor (IF),
which is the most common measure of a journal’s impact and quality (though see
criticisms of this measure by Horvat et al. 2016; Brembs et al. 2013; Moustafa 2014).
Unfortunately, an IF is unavailable for most journals in philosophy; other available
classifications of journals were thus considered in our study (Polonioli 2016). One
quantitative ranking is provided by the h-index, and it is possible to find a ranking of
philosophy journals based on this last metric.3 Informal polls are also a popular way of
ranking philosophy journals, and a rather established ranking is published on the blog
www.leiterreports.com. Here, we considered all of the journals that both publish original
peer-reviewed research and are included in rankings based on h-index and Leiter
Report’s poll, and selected the top-20 relevant journals from each of these two rankings.
Of the journals included in either ranking, only the journal Philosophy Compass was
excluded because it publishes only (typically invited) review articles. Because of the
partial overlap between the lists, the sample eventually included the 29 journals.
Second, we selected all papers employing quantitative methods that were published
between 2013 and 2016 in the 29 philosophy journals above. Polonioli (2017) considered
3 https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?view_op=top_venues&hl=it&vq=hum_philosophy
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only 3 years (2013–2015); here we considered an additional, fourth year. Further, unlike
Polonioli (2017), we excluded qualitative research articles because in the current study the
focus is on the handling of quantitative results. To select the relevant papers, we accessed
the PDF version of each article published in the chosen journals between 2013 and 2016,
and searched for the keywords ‘experiment,’ ‘empirical,’ ‘subject(s),’ ‘participant(s),’
‘sample,’ ‘test,’ and ‘statistic(al).’ In cases where we deemed the keyword-based search
strategy to be less effective for discriminating between empirical research and literature
reviews, we read the paper. This process resulted in the identification of 134 articles as
quantitative research articles. Information regarding the journals in our sample and the
number of quantitative articles per journal is listed below (for a full list of the articles, see
the Supplementary Information (https://osf.io/yp2kg)):
1. Noûs (n = 4)
2. Philosophical studies (n = 11)
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (n = 4)
4. Mind (n = 1)
5. Analysis (n = 2)
6. Synthese (n = 13)
7. Mind and language (n = 7)
8. Philosophers’ Imprint (n = 3)
9. Australasian journal of philosophy (n = 2)
10. Erkenntnis (n = 2)
11. Review of Philosophy and Psychology (n = 25)
12. Ergo (n = 3)
13. Philosophical Review (n = 0)
14. Philosophical Quarterly (n = 0)
15. Canadian Journal of Philosophy (n = 0)
16. Philosophical Psychology (n = 44)
17. Ethics (n = 0)
18. Journal of Philosophy (n = 0)
19. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (n = 0)
20. Journal of Consciousness Studies (n = 11)
21. Philosophical Perspectives (n = 0)
22. Ratio (n = 2)
23. Journal of Philosophical Logic (n = 0)
24. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (n = 0)
25. American Philosophical Quarterly (n = 0)
26. Studies in Philosophy and Education (n = 0)
27. European Journal of Political Theory (n = 0)
28. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (n = 0)
29. European Journal of Philosophy (n = 0)
2.2 Procedure
The selected articles were screened according to an adapted and expanded version of
the list of categories used by Tressoldi et al. (2013). We searched for reporting of
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confidence intervals as well as measures of effect size, interpretations of reported effect
size and details on prospective statistical power. Presence of these items was coded in a
binary fashion (present/absent). Following Tressoldi et al. (2013), we applied lenient
criteria—a feature was coded as present if at least one instance of it appeared in the
paper (i.e., if a single effect size was reported in a paper, we coded effect sizes as
present in that paper, even if there were other points in that paper where an effect size
could have been reported but was not). We also screened papers to identify mentions of
p values or null hypothesis significance testing, and the use of error bars in figures.
Further, we also explored the extent to which papers adopted Bayesian statistics rather
than null hypothesis significance testing. For the full coding instructions we worked
with, see the Supplementary Information (https://osf.io/yp2kg).
The procedures and methodology used in our study also try to complement the
perspective offered by Tressoldi et al. (2013) by exploring further aspects of reporting.
These include reporting of information on sample size and demographics, details of study
design, and criteria for exclusion of participants. Finally, we examine reports of prospective
and/or observed statistical power. By covering a wider set of aspects than previous efforts,
the present study is better equipped to provide a snapshot of current practices with regard to
design, analysis, and reporting of research in Experimental Philosophy. It allows for a
health check of practices in the field, informing discussions about findings’ replicability as
well as the possibility of their inclusion in meta-analytic studies.
We also examine the relationship between citations and quality of reporting. The
association between reporting standards and impact (in the form of citations) is
currently unclear. On the one hand, publications may be cited for a variety of reasons.
For instance, researchers may cite others to support their own claims, methodology or
findings. Other papers are cited in order to criticize their central claims (Harwood
2008). Some papers are cited as examples of well-conducted research, while others
might be cited as examples of research that is poorly designed or conducted (Aksnes
and Sivertsen 2004). Nevertheless, while citation counts are a function of many
variables, when a particular paper is cited more than others it is usually assumed that
this reflects its higher quality (Bornmann et al. 2012); even when authors disagree with
cited research, it is assumed they would not go to the trouble to argue with low-quality
work, and that—at least in the long run—low-quality work will be condemned to
oblivion while good work continues to get cited (and sometimes debated). This
assumption underlies the importance, in present-day academia, of individual re-
searchers’ h-index and the impact factors of the journals they publish in: both citation
measures influence careers by direct effects on promotions, tenure decisions, and
success in research funding applications (Acuna et al. 2012).
But is the assumed association between quality and number of citations real? Egghe
and Rousseau (1990) suggested that four important assumptions form the basis for all
reliance on citation counts. First, citing an article implies actual use of that document by
the citing author; second, citation reflects the merit (quality, significance, impact) of the
cited article; third, the best possible work relevant to any point is cited; and fourth, a
cited article is related in content to the one that cites it. In light of these assumptions, it
is important to distinguish between the normative claim that quality should be a key
factor in determining citations and the empirical claim that quality does correlate with
citation counts. For example, Baird and Oppenheim (1994) investigated citations in
Information Science, and concluded that Bcitation counts mean a statistical likelihood
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of high quality research^. Conversely, Nieminen et al. (2006) examined citations of
studies in Psychiatry—specifically to determine whether reporting quality and statisti-
cal analyses were associated with citations—and found no such correlation. Even if we
disregard the normative question of whether reporting quality should be a factor in
deciding whether a given paper gets cited, it is useful to examine whether in practice,
the reporting quality of studies in Experimental Philosophy is reflected in their impact
as indexed by number of citations. We thus examined the number of times each of the
analyzed articles has been cited4 and explored whether the citation count was related to
our measures of reporting quality.
Finally, we also explored whether having at least one non-philosopher among the
authors was associated with a higher quality of reporting. We considered the affiliations
listed on the published article and in cases in which authors were affiliated to an
interdisciplinary center or no clear information about their institution was available, the
subject of their PhD was considered to determine the relevant subject area.
We used point-biserial correlations to assess the relationship between the number of
citations and various dimensions of reporting quality. We also used Chi-square tests of
independence, where appropriate, to explore the association between authors’ affilia-
tion and relevant variables pertaining to reporting quality. Statistical analyses were
performed using SPSS v. 22, JASP 0.8.3.1 (JASP Team 2016), and R statistical
software (R Development Core Team 2018).
2.3 Inter-Coder Reliability
To ensure that idiosyncratic biases and coding errors did not affect the assessment of
empirical papers, articles were coded independently by three coders (authors AP, MVM
and BB). Seventy-two papers were coded by at least two different authors; for these, as
Table 1 shows, percentage of agreement ranged from 96% to 100% on all variables,
with Kappa coefficients ranging from .66 to 1 (all ps < .001).
3 Results
Table 2 shows a summary of descriptive results pertaining to the whole sample of
papers.
Author Characteristics Although over half of the papers had at least one non-
philosopher co-author, the first and corresponding author of nearly three-quarters of
them was a philosopher, suggesting that non-philosophers may often play an advisory
role—perhaps on issues of methodology. This raises potential concerns about the large
minority of papers that did not have co-authors with methodological and statistical
expertise. We are, of course, unable to estimate the number of philosopher authors who
had obtained relevant training, but we note again that statistics and experimental design
4 We used Google Scholar to count citations. Although this is not necessarily the most accurate database, it
does incorporate citations from outside the field of philosophy (unlike Philpapers), and is not manually curated
(unlike Scopus, Web of Knowledge or PubMed), meaning it offers the widest collection of citations for each of
the papers we analysed.
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are not typically part of a philosophical education. Of course, the mere fact that a co-
author is not a philosopher does not automatically imply that they possess the relevant
quantitative competence. We therefore checked the affiliations of the non-philosopher
co-authors of papers in our sample: of the 73 papers that had at least one non-
philosopher co-author, 59 had co-authors affiliated with Psychology or Cognitive
Science, 7 with Economics or Business, 2 with Computer Science and 4 with medicine.
Overall, the overwhelming majority of papers had a co-author from fields in which the
acquisition of statistical and quantitative skills is a standard part of academic training.
Methods Information Details of methods were generally reported in reasonable
detail. Nearly all the papers we examined reported sample size; a majority explicitly
reported demographics, allowing for assessment of the study’s generalizability (at least
with regard to age and gender, the most common reported categories). Most studies
explicitly described the study’s design either in the relevant part of the Methods section
or alongside the statistical test employed (we note that an explicit, formal description of
the design—i.e., reporting whether the manipulation was within or between partici-
pants, specifying the independent and dependent variables, etc.—is not a universal
requirement for scientific reports; although it is considered good practice, an attentive
Table 2 Summary of variables for all papers (N = 134)
Variable n % papers
Author characteristics
First author a philosopher 95 71%
Corresponding author a philosopher 97 72%
At least one non-philosopher 73 54%
Methods information
Sample size reported 133 99%
Participant Demographics reported 100 75%
Design reported 91 68%
M-Turk used for data collection 59 44%
Participant exclusions reported 59 44%
Descriptive statistics
Central tendency measures (means, medians)
and/or frequency measures (e.g., percentages)
130 97%
Standard Errors (SE) 37 28%
Error bars in figures 58 43%
Inferential statistics
NHST (p-values) used 129 96%
Effect Size (ES) reported 71 53%
ES interpreted 29 22%
Confidence Intervals (CI) reported 38 28%
Prospective power reported 2 1%
Observed power reported 7 5%
Bayes Factor 2 1%
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reader can usually fathom the design if the procedure is clearly described). A little under
half of the studies were conducted online and data were collected using the M-Turk
platform; this popular platform allows for efficient data collection, but has also been
reported to yield discrepant results with laboratory studies in some experimental psychol-
ogy paradigms (Crump et al. 2013), suggesting that its usefulness should not be taken for
granted but rather evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Finally, fewer than half of the papers
provided information about participants removed from analysis (both number of partici-
pants removed and reason for exclusion); it is impossible, of course, to know howmany of
the papers that did not report exclusions actually had any, but we note that exclusions—
e.g., of outliers—are an extremely common practice in psychology.
Descriptive Statistics Nearly all the papers reported their results in terms of either central
tendency measures (means, medians or modes) or frequencies (either raw numbers or
percentages). Just over a quarter reported standard errors, although over 40% included error
bars in figures. Of those papers whose figures showed error bars (n = 58), the bars
represented either standard errors (n = 22, 38%) or confidence intervals (n = 17, 29%).
One paper (~2%) included one figure showing standard errors and another figure showing
confidence intervals, and the remaining papers showing error bars did not report what the
bars represented in the figure(s) (n = 18, 31%). None of the papers that identified what their
error bars represented used them to show standard deviations.
Inferential Statistics Almost all of the papers applied null hypothesis significance
testing, but only just over half of them reported measures of effect size, and less than a
quarter of the sample provided an interpretation of a reported effect size. Similarly,
fewer than a third complemented the reported p-values with confidence intervals. A
very small number of studies reported analyses of statistical power—either prospective
or observed, despite a growing concern that the preponderance of underpowered studies
is contributing to the high proportion of false positives in scientific publishing (Button
et al. 2013; Open Science Collaboration 2015). Finally, only two studies employed
Bayes Factors. Although this practice is not yet pervasive in related fields such as
experimental psychology either, adopting Bayesian approaches has been recommended
as a way to address the shortcomings of NHST.
Association Between Number of Citations and Reporting Practices Are better
studies (or at least ones with better reporting) cited more? We performed point-
biserial correlations to explore possible associations between number of citations and
statistical reporting practices (specifically, whether or not ES, CI and SE were reported)
as well as the association between number of citations and quality indicators of
methodology reporting (whether or not descriptive statistics, sample size or demo-
graphics were reported).
We calculated correlations separately for each year in our sample, because number of
citations is confounded by time since publication: naturally, the older studies had a higher
mean number of citations (2013: M = 18.88, SD = 19.62; 2014: M = 20.86, SD = 30.97;
2015:M = 8.47, SD = 9.35; 2016:M = 4.57, SD = 5.10). For the newer studies (2015–16),
not enough time has passed to assess with any reliability how well they have been cited.
Overall, our analysis indicates very little (if any) association between markers of
reporting quality and citations: the majority of correlations were low and far from
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conventional statistical significance, and the few that reached significance were mostly
negative (note that absence of amarker was always coded as ‘0’, and its presence as ‘1’, so a
negative correlation suggests more citations when a marker was absent; this was the case in
2013 for reporting of demographics, and in 2014 for reporting effect size and design).
Furthermore, none of the correlations replicated across years, and (considering the number
of correlation analyses run) none would survive a correction for multiple comparisons
(Table 3).
These findings indicate that there is no evidence that adopting better reporting
practices is currently beneficial for authors in terms of getting cited. This may be due
to a lack of awareness in the field: If authors are not aware of the need for such
practices, they will not give adequate reporting appropriate weight in their assessment
of a study’s value and their decision on whether to cite it, potentially leading to over-
citation of methodologically flawed studies and under-citation of sound ones.
Authors’ Disciplinary Background and Variables of Reporting Quality Is having
at least one non-philosopher among the authors associated with any of the reporting
quality variables discussed above? We employed Chi-squares tests to explore the
association between author composition (i.e., whether the author list included at least
one non-philosopher vs all authors being philosophers) and various reporting measures.
Reporting of CI was significantly associated with author composition (χ 2 (1) = 8.79,
p = .003, φ = .256); the distribution of frequencies among these two variables is shown
on Table 4. Interestingly, the table shows that papers written without the help of non-
philosophers were more, not less, likely to report CIs. Neither of the remaining two
tests for associations with reporting statistical measures yielded statistically significant
findings (association with reporting ES: (χ 2 (1) < 1, p = .352, φ = .080; association
with reporting SE: (χ 2 (1) = 1.22, p = .270, φ = .095).
Having at least one non-philosopher among the authors was also not associated with
whether or not papers explicitly reported their design (χ 2 (1) < 1, p = .558, φ = .051),
or demographics (χ 2 (1) < 1, p = .544, φ = .052).
Testing Associations among Reporting-Quality Variables We also explored possible
associations between variables indexing statistical reporting-quality (reporting of ES
and CI) and methods-reporting quality (reporting of design and demographics). A set of
chi-square tests revealed that papers reporting effect sizes were also significantly more
likely to report design details (χ 2 (1) = 13.16, p < .001,φ = .313) and demographics (χ
2 (1) = 19.20, p < .001, φ = .378; Tables 5 and 6 respectively). We found no significant
association between reporting CI and design details (χ 2 (1) < 1, p = .368, φ = .078) or
demographics (χ 2 (1) < 1, p = .470, φ = .062).
Finally, use of M-Turk was significantly associated with reporting exclusion of
participants (χ 2 (1) = 6.06, p = .014, φ = .213, Table 7). We expand on the
significance of this finding in the Discussion.
4 Discussion
Our analyses examined the reporting practices employed in a large sample of empirical
studies published in leading philosophy journals over a recent 4-year period. We found
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Table 3 Point-biserial correlations (rpb) between number of citations and methods information, descriptive
statistics and inferential statistics by year
rpb p Lower 95% CI Upper 95% CI
Year 2013 (n = 41)
Methods information
Citations – Sample size −0.091 0.573 −0.388 0.223
Citations – Demographics −0.320 * 0.042 −0.571 −0.013
Citations – Design −0.177 0.268 −0.460 0.138
Descriptive statistics
Citations – Central tendency/Frequency 0.007 0.965 −0.301 0.314
Citations – Standard Errors (SE) −0.190 0.235 −0.470 0.125
Inferential statistics
Citations – Effect Size (ES) −0.202 0.206 −0.480 0.113
Citations – Confidence Intervals (CI) 0.055 0.733 −0.257 0.357
Year 2014 (n = 22)
Methods information
Citations – Sample size NaNa NaN NaN NaN
Citations – Demographics 0.051 0.823 −0.379 0.462
Citations – Design −0.515 * 0.014 −0.770 −0.120
Descriptive statistics
Citations – Central tendency/Frequency −0.017 0.940 −0.436 0.407
Citations – Standard Errors (SE) −0.045 0.844 −0.458 0.384
Inferential statistics
Citations – Effect Size (ES) −0.437 * 0.042 −0.725 −0.019
Citations – Confidence Intervals (CI) 0.339 0.122 −0.096 0.666
Year 2015 (n = 34)
Methods information
Citations – Sample size NaN a NaN NaN NaN
Citations – Demographics 0.247 0.160 −0.100 0.540
Citations – Design 0.362 * 0.035 0.027 0.624
Descriptive statistics
Citations – Central tendency/Frequency 0.160 0.366 −0.188 0.473
Citations – Standard Errors (SE) −0.013 0.941 −0.350 0.326
Inferential statistics
Citations – Effect Size (ES) −0.156 0.377 −0.470 0.192
Citations – Confidence Intervals (CI) −0.051 0.774 −0.383 0.292
Year 2016 (n = 37)
Methods information
Citations – Sample size NaN a NaN NaN NaN
Citations – Demographics 0.013 0.938 −0.312 0.336
Citations – Design 0.038 0.823 −0.290 0.358
Descriptive statistics
Citations – Central tendency/Frequency NaN b NaN NaN NaN
Citations – Standard Errors (SE) −0.038 0.823 −0.358 0.290
Inferential statistics
Citations – Effect Size (ES) −0.018 0.915 −0.340 0.308
Citations – Confidence Intervals (CI) −0.044 0.797 −0.363 0.284
*p < .05 (2-tailed)
** Bonferroni adj. α = .05/28, p < .0018; note that none of the correlations that reach conventional significance
survive this correction
a Variance = 0 for reporting of Sample size
b Variance = 0 for reporting of Central tendency/Frequency
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that NHST (in the form of reporting p-values) is overwhelmingly the dominant
statistical analysis approach. During the period we examined, the older field of
experimental psychology has gradually acknowledged the shortcomings of over-
reliance on p-values as a sole marker of findings’ meaningfulness, and reporting
complementary measures such as effect sizes and confidence intervals has become
common. In Experimental Philosophy, however, this is not yet the norm: only half of
the papers we examined reported measures of effect size, and still fewer reported
confidence intervals. (Admittedly, confidence intervals have a one-to-one relation with
p-values, but they are widely viewed as being more straightforward to interpret).
Furthermore, it is now accepted in the fields of experimental psychology and cognitive
neuroscience that underpowered studies have, in the past, led to an over-representation of
false positives in the published record; this has led to a recent emphasis on using
prospective power analysis, when possible, to pre-determine sample sizes; to a lesser
extent, reporting of observed power has also increased. We find no evidence of this trend
in the Experimental Philosophy literature: among the studies we assessed, a very small
number made any reference at all to statistical power. Finally, very few studies employed
more sophisticated statistical approaches, such as Bayes factor.
The results reported here suggest that to date, Experimental Philosophy has adopted
analytical and reporting practices that are closer to those that dominated psychology
and cognitive neuroscience before the re-examination prompted by recent concerns
about a replication crisis (Button et al. 2013; Open Science Collaboration 2012, 2015).
In our Introduction, we reviewed surveys of the Psychology literature that spanned the
years 1996 to 2013. We showed that reporting of effect sizes, for example, has
increased from 26% of the articles sampled in 1996–2000 (Matthews et al. 2008) to
over 90% in a survey of articles published in Canadian psychology journals in 2013
(Counsell and Harlow 2017). The turning point seems to be after 2010, as a survey of
papers from 2009 to 2010 still found effect sizes were reported in only about 40% of
Table 4 Frequencies for author composition by Confidence Intervals (CI) reporting
CI
At least one non-philosopher? Not reported Reported Total
NO 36 25 61
YES 60 13 73
Total 96 38 134
Table 5 Frequencies for effect size (ES) by reporting of design
Design
ES Not reported Reported Total
Not reported 30 33 63
Reported 13 58 71
Total 43 91 134
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studies (Fritz et al. 2012); and a large-scale analysis of survey articles (Fritz et al. 2013)
examining articles published in psychology journals between 1990 and 2010 found
only 3% reported power analysis, 10% reported confidence intervals, and 38% reported
effect sizes (although an upward trend across this period was noted for effect sizes).
This has changed in recent years (though the process is still ongoing): Tressoldi et al.
(2013), found that effect sizes and confidence intervals were reported in a majority of
articles published in 2011 in both high and low impact journals (with the notable—and
lamentable—exception of the highest-impact venues, Nature and Science), in some
journals reaching 90% - the figure also found by Counsell and Harlow (2017). In light
of this, our findings that only 53% of Experimental Philosophy articles in our sample
reported effect sizes, and only 28% provided confidence intervals, suggest that statis-
tical reporting practices in Experimental Philosophy seem to be lagging a few years
behind those of comparable fields.
The studies we examined almost always provided information about sample size.
Other important information about sample demographics and study design was less
commonly (though frequently) reported. However, fewer than half of the studies
directly referred to the number of participants that had been excluded from analysis.
It is possible, of course, that the low proportion of reported exclusions is due to a low
rate of exclusions in the studies themselves, and that all authors who excluded
participants also reported this explicitly. However, it is noteworthy that participant
exclusion is a highly-common practice in psychology and related fields; although there
are often good justifications for doing so (e.g., when participants fail to engage with the
task, are unable to perform it adequately, or have clear response biases), the practice has
also been highlighted as an element of ‘researcher degrees of freedom’ (Simmons et al.
2011). Specifically, when exclusion criteria are not set a-priori (and reported as such),
this leaves potential room for introduction of novel exclusion criteria after the results
are known; this may, in turn, make it easier to obtain statistically-significant results—
Table 6 Frequencies for effect size (ES) by reporting of demographics
Demographics
ES Not reported Reported Total
Not reported 27 36 63
Reported 7 64 71
Total 34 100 134
Table 7 Frequencies for use of M-Turk by exclusion of participants
Participants excluded?
M-Turk No Yes Total
No 49 26 75
Yes 26 33 59
Total 75 59 134
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and due to the human susceptibility to cognitive biases, which even those who do
research on such biases are not immune to (Simmons et al. 2011), the best researchers,
armed with the best of intentions, may be unaware that they are using exclusion rules
they would not have invoked before the data were known.
Our current sample gives reason to believe that participant exclusion may also be
common in Experimental Philosophy, due to the large variety of criteria that have been
applied when such exclusions were reported. On the one hand, as mentioned above,
there are often perfectly valid reasons for excluding participants. On the other hand,
however, the need to exclude a substantial number of participants (in some cases, over
half) should be avoided as much as possible, to prevent concerns about researcher-
degrees-of-freedom (Simmons et al. 2011) and statistical artefacts (Shanks 2017) as
alternative explanations for reported findings. Several of the studies we surveyed
excluded a large number of participants for failing basic comprehension tests or
otherwise showing that they did not follow task requirements: For example, Wilkenfeld
et al. (2016) tested 142 participants but also mention that a further 188 participants were
excluded for failing to consent, failing to complete the experiment, or giving an
incorrect response to one of the reading or comprehension questions; Horvath and
Wiegmann (2016) excluded the data of 142 (out of 284) subjects who did not complete
the survey or completed it in under 1 min; Berniūnas and Dranseika (2016) excluded 52
of 300 participants for failing a comprehension task; and Roberts et al. (2016) tested
140 participants but excluded 72 of them—65 for answering one or more comprehen-
sion questions incorrectly, and 7 because they had formal training in philosophy. When
a large proportion of participants fails comprehension tests, this implies that the task
design may have benefitted from additional piloting, prior to running the study, in order
to make its content sufficiently clear to participants; and restrictions that disqualify
from participation and can be known in advance (such as having formal training in
philosophy) should be applied during initial participant screening rather than after data
collection. The flipside of exclusion criteria is very strict inclusion criteria: Holtzman
(2013) reported that out of 1195 participants recruited through blogs and social
networks and who had completed his survey, he focused only on 234 philosophers
who held a PhD or DPhil in philosophy. There is nothing wrong with conducting
research on populations with specific educational or professional backgrounds; but
ideally, recruitment procedures should prevent the sample from consisting mostly of
participants who do not belong to the relevant population.
Most of the above examples are of studies that used online platforms for data
collection. Although such platforms are incredibly useful, their use may also result in
the recruitment of a high number of unsuitable participants or a low level of participant
engagement, which can negatively impact the quality of the data collected. This attests
to the difficulties involved in carrying out research online; however, such difficulties
must be mitigated through rigorous recruitment procedures and the use of comprehen-
sible tasks. Unless the measured variables are entirely independent of the exclusion
criteria (a requirement that is very hard to verify), excessive post-hoc data selection—
even when completely justified in light of the study’s goals—can lead to results that are
pure artefacts resulting from regression to the mean (Shanks 2017). Finally, many of the
concerns raised by data exclusion can be assuaged by adhering to two simple recom-
mendations: Pre-registering the study before it is run, including details of its proposed
exclusion criteria and analysis plans; and reporting the effect of exclusions on the
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results after the study is concluded. We go into further detail on both of these
recommendations below.
The sample of studies covered by our analysis is representative of the work being
published in leading philosophy journals, but is obviously not entirely comprehensive:
some Experimental Philosophy articles have not been included in our sample because they
were published in journals such as Episteme, an outlet that was not listed in the two
rankings considered in this study. Furthermore, the sample of journals considered here is
rather heterogeneous: for example, some of the journals that are classed here as philosoph-
ical, such asReview of Philosophy and Psychology, are outlets intended to attract genuinely
interdisciplinary research. It should also be noted that the classification of authors as
philosophers and non-philosophers is at least somewhat arbitrary. We considered the
affiliation at the time of publication (usually given in the published article) but this might
not fully capture the researcher’s educational background. Finally, it could be argued that
the sample itself is not large enough, at 134 papers, to adequately cover the field’s norms on
such a diverse range of variables, not all of which are relevant to all the papers in the
sample. While we acknowledge that any sample meant to reflect a greater whole could
benefit from being larger, we do believe that our principled choice of leading journals,
combined with our methodology for selecting all the empirical papers these journals
published over a substantial period, provides a representative picture of the state of the
art as indicated by the field’s leading publication venues.
We also note that our coding strategy (a score of B0^ for the answer Bno^, and a score of
B1^ for the answer Byes^) has a limited resolution, meaning that items which varied in their
degree of completeness could still be given the same score. Importantly, however, this is
likely to have resulted in a more positive picture of reporting practices than the actual
reality: Any mention of a relevant variable (e.g., effect size) would lead to a paper being
assigned a value of 1 for that variable, even if the report itself was partial or applied
inconsistently (or even incorrectly, an issue we did not delve into); a value of 0 was only
assigned if the paper did not mention the variable at all. This may have somewhat inflated
the number of papers coded with a value of 1 for any given variable.
On the other hand, the keyword-based search deployed here may have also occa-
sionally missed some papers which did, in fact, report on a particular variable. In
particular, in examining the reporting of study design features, we assessed whether the
study was presented as Bwithin subjects^, Bbetween subjects^, Brepeated measures^ or
Bindependent groups^; however, even in psychological research these labels are not
universally used in reports; it is often assumed that educated readers would be able to
infer such design features from the description of the study.
Notably, we focus here on the type of information reported, not on reporting or
analysis errors. In the field of psychology, recent studies (Veldkamp et al. 2014; Nuijten
et al. 2016) have focused instead on the prevalence of inconsistent p-values in top
psychology journals by means of an automated procedure to retrieve and check errors
in the reporting of statistical results. A recent application of this type of analysis to the
field of Experimental Philosophy (Colombo et al. 2018) concludes that statistical
inconsistencies are not more widespread in Experimental Philosophy than in psychol-
ogy—meaning that when experimental philosophers use NHST, they do not tend to
make consistency errors any more than psychologists do.
Despite its limitations, we believe our study of current practices for reporting the
design and analysis of Experimental Philosophy research offers interesting and
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potentially important findings. Such investigations provide insight into what re-
searchers are doing well and what could be done to improve research and reporting
practices in future studies. This complements direct assessments of replicability, such as
the XPhi Replicability Project, a recent large-scale effort to reproduce central Experi-
mental Philosophy findings (Cova et al. 2018 https://osf.io/dvkpr/), which has provided
encouraging data about current levels of replication in the field. We should not be
complacent, though: Ensuring continued replicability requires the consistent adoption
of appropriate reporting practices. We therefore end this report with a set of
recommendations for authors, editors and reviewers of Experimental Philosophy
papers (see Fig. 1 for a summary infographic).
We start with a general recommendation for philosophers and academic philosophy
departments. A growing number of philosophers are carrying out empirical research,
and an increasing number (in sub-fields such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of
neuroscience and psychology) view empirical findings as directly relevant to their
conceptual analysis. If this trend is to continue, it will become essential for philosophers
to acquire statistical literacy as part of their education. Statistical analyses are the lens
through which present-day science looks at empirical data. Therefore, an adequate
understanding of statistics—including current developments and controversies in rele-
vant fields—should not be outsourced to collaborators from other fields, but rather
should become as integral to a philosopher’s education as courses in logic currently are.
As for authors, editors and reviewers, we strongly endorse the recommendations of
Simmons et al. (2011), who made a list of suggestions aimed at reducing the number of
false-positive publications by putting in place checks on experimenter degrees of
freedom. These recommendations were aimed at researchers in psychology, but are
equally applicable to any field in which statistics are used to analyze empirical data, and
particularly to fields where those data are human behaviors, beliefs and attitudes. We
Fig. 1 Recommendations for authors, editors and reviewers of Experimental Philosophy studies. This list
complements the recommendations that Simmons et al. (2011) made for Psychology. We repeat two of their
recommendations (marked with asterisks) but endorse all of their suggestions. The present recommendations
build on practices that have been adopted in recent years in other empirical fields, but have yet to become the
norm in Experimental Philosophy
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will not repeat those recommendations here, but our recommendations below do
include a couple of them that, in light of the present findings, seem to have particular
relevance to Experimental Philosophy.
For example, it seems particularly necessary for authors in Experimental Philosophy to
take heed of Simmons et al.’s (2011) recommendation that BIf observations are eliminated,
authors must also report what the statistical results are if those observations are included^.
Further requirements also make sense in light of the large number of exclusions in some of
the studies examined here (none of which report whether and to what extent application of
exclusion or inclusion criteria affected the results): reports must commit to having defined
the rules for exclusion prior to conducting any analysis (including the calculation of
descriptive statistics), and must provide a clear rationale for such exclusions, to prevent
ad-hoc removal of participants. Furthermore, to prevent undisclosed exclusions, papers
should always explicitly report whether any participants were excluded or not.
More generally, transparency can be improved by adopting pre-registration. There is
increasing support across the sciences for the idea of pre-registering studies, with
initiatives such as the Preregistration Challenge (http://cos.io/prereg) offering
assistance and incentives to conduct pre-registered research, and journals such as
Psychological Science awarding ‘badges’ to papers that employ various good practices,
including pre-registration. Current pre-registration platforms (e.g., the Open Science
Framework, http://osf.io/; and AsPredicted, http://AsPredicted.org/) allow registration
to consist simply of the basic study design, although they also enable inclusion of a
detailed pre-specification of the study’s procedures, expected outcomes and plan for
statistical analysis (including exclusion criteria). Importantly, pre-registering the anal-
ysis plan does not preclude analyses that were not originally considered, or further
analyses on subsets of the data; rather, it enables a clear and transparent distinction
between confirmatory (pre-registered) and exploratory analyses, with the acknowledg-
ment that it is often the latter kind that leads to the most interesting follow-up research.
With regard to specific analysis techniques, NHST is the main approach to statistical
analysis in Experimental Philosophy (and is still the norm in Experimental Psychology
too). However, experimental philosophers should take heed of the recent move in
psychology toward augmenting p-values with measures of effect size and increased
use of confidence intervals. In particular, a paper’s discussion and interpretation of its
findings should focus on effect sizes, as they are more informative than simply
reporting whether a finding was statistically significant.
The use of other statistical approaches in place of NHST (e.g., Bayesian analysis) is
also on the rise in psychology and other sciences, although the use of these approaches
is still controversial: Simmons et al. (2011) oppose the adoption of Bayesian statistics
as a way of addressing the shortcomings of p-values, noting that such analyses are
prone to arbitrary assumptions (e.g., in the choice of prior probabilities) that, along with
simply adding another set of tests to choose from, increase researcher degrees of
freedom; several other authors (e.g., Dienes 2011, 2014; Kruschke 2013; Rouder
et al. 2009), focus instead on the usefulness of Bayesian analyses for establishing
whether the evidence supports the null hypothesis. Whatever the outcome of these
debates, experimental philosophers should remain up to date on the current consensus
regarding best practice.
Authors should also make sure they provide all the relevant information on both the
methods and results. Although the vast majority of the studies we examined reported
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their sample size, a much smaller number reported sample demographics that would allow
an assessment of their findings’ generalizability. Furthermore, many studies were vague on
design and procedure details that determine whether a reader who wanted to conduct an
exact replication would be able to do so. To facilitate clear and comprehensive writing,
journal editors should recognize that word limits can be a serious obstacle to proper
reporting of methods and results. In light of this, journals such as Psychological Science
have now made clear that BThe Method and Results sections of Research Articles do not
count toward the total word count limit. The aim here is to allow authors to provide clear,
complete, self-contained descriptions of their studies^ (Psychological Science 2018). We
suggest that editors of Philosophy journals should also consider revising their guidelines
and strive to allow for sufficient level of detail in reporting.
Philosophers are not as accustomed as psychologists are to using graphs to make
their point, but Experimental Philosophy authors should present their findings graph-
ically if visualization allows for readers to better see trends and patterns (Matejka and
Fitzmaurice 2017). For example, although there is some controversy about the use of
bar-graphs to display results (see Bar Bar Plots Project 20175; Pastore et al. 2017), there
is a consensus that bar graphs showing means are uninterpretable without including
error bars representing standard errors, standard deviations, or confidence intervals;
when including error bars, the measure they represent should be clearly indicated.
However, even when graphics are helpful, authors should always provide numerical
values for descriptive statistics and effect sizes as well, so that the study can be included
in future replication efforts, Bayesian analyses and meta-analyses. To avoid redundan-
cy, numerical values that are represented in graphic depictions can be given in
supplementary online information , which is allowed by most journals. In cases in
which journals do not allow authors to use supplementary materials , editors and
publishers should consider updating their editorial policies to allow for their use.
Further, it is the role of editors and reviewers to verify that appropriate reporting
practices, including those detailed above, are adhered to. In particular, editors of
philosophy journals that publish experimental papers should make it a habit to go
outside their usual reviewer pool and seek reviewers with the relevant methodological
and statistical expertise to evaluate the empirical aspects of the work.
Reviewers, for their part, should focus not only on the content of the findings but
also make sure to address quality of reporting, verifying the clarity and completeness of
empirical methods, and the use of statistical analyses that go further than simply
reporting p-values. As recommended by Simmons et al. (2011), reviewers should also
be tolerant of imperfections in the results—empirical data are messy, and an unrealistic
expectation for perfectly neat stories is a strong incentive for researchers to apply so-
called ‘researcher degrees of freedom’. Although we have no evidence that unrealistic
demands are a particular problem amongst reviewers of Experimental Philosophy
studies, we do note that real data often lend themselves less comfortably to the kind
of air-tight conceptual arguments that philosophers are more accustomed to.
The rapid recent growth of Experimental Philosophy suggests exciting prospects for
informing philosophical arguments using empirical data. This burgeoning field must,
however, insure itself against facing its own replication crisis in years to come by taking
5 https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1474588473/barbarplots
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advantage of insights reached, over the same recent period, by other fields; adopting best-
practice standards in analysis and reporting should go a long way towards this goal.
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